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Abstract
Bargainers in an open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situation may perceive envy, a
utility loss caused by receiving the smaller share that is modeled in some social preferences
in addition to self-interest. I extend Rubinstein (1982)’s original solution of the bargaining
problem for two self-interested bargainers to this strategic situation. Bargainers still reach
agreement in the first period and their bargaining shares increase in the strength of their
own envy. As both bargainers’ envy diminishes, the agreed partition converges to the Ru-
binstein division. If equally patient bargaining parties exhibit similar envy, then the agreed
partition is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards the equal division. Notably,
the potential sensation of envy also boosts the share of the eventually envy-free party who
leaves the bargaining with the larger share under the agreed partition. This gain in bargain-
ing strength through envy can result in a bargaining outcome that is more unequal than
predicted by the Rubinstein division.
Keywords: alternating offers, bargaining, bargaining power, behavioral economics, envy, equity,
fairness, inequality aversion, negotiation, social preferences
JEL classifications: C72, C78, C91, D03, D31, D63
1 Introduction
Bargaining encounters are a frequent interaction in economic life. They share the feature that a
mutually beneficial outcome can be realized if the parties participating in the bargaining pro-
cess reach agreement. Rubinstein (1982) proposed a seminal framework to investigate strategic
behavior in open-ended alternating-offer bargaining situations. It predicts a unique outcome
of this bargaining process, reveals the interdependence of bargainers’ intertemporal strategic
considerations and has been widely used to forecast bargaining outcomes of self-interested par-
ties. The bargaining problem was narrowed down by Rubinstein to the following situation and
question: “Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agreements. Both
have interests in reaching agreement but their interests are not entirely identical. What ‘will
be’ the agreed contract, assuming that both bargainers behave rationally?” [...] “Two other
problems that may be asked about the bargaining situation, namely: (A) the positive ques-
tion - what is the agreement reached in practice; (B) the normative question - what is the just
agreement” were left outside the original investigation. Thus, its contribution is a selection
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mechanism to decide which of numerous individually rational and Pareto optimal contracts
will be agreed. As the framework was not intended as a positive theory, unsurprisingly, sub-
sequent bargaining experiments confirmed deviations between the theoretical predictions and
observed outcomes.
Building on Rubinstein’s plausible and instructive model, this paper studies the additional
impact of a psychological element, suggested, for instance, by Von Neumann & Morgenstern
(1944), on the intertemporal utility maximization in the bargaining of two rational bargainers.
Ample evidence suggests that at least some people show regard for others, which includes as-
pects of envy (e.g., Camerer 2003; Cooper & Kagel n.d.; De Bruyn & Bolton 2008; Kohler 2012c;
Smith 2008; Zwick et al. 1992). Neural Correlates of envy were shown in functional magnetic
resonance imaging studies that associated stronger envy with stronger anterior cingulate cor-
tex activation Takahashi et al. (2009). I extend Rubinstein’s solution of the alternating-offer
bargaining problem to envious bargainers. Envy is modeled as a utility loss from receiving the
smaller share by assuming an asymmetric preference of linear inequality aversion. I show that
there is an unique subgame perfect equilibrium, in which bargainers agree in the first period
(as in Rubinstein 1982), and calculate the equilibrium payoffs. Deriving the subgame perfect
equilibrium stepwise by backwards induction uncovers how either bargainer’s envy affects
the strategic decision-making of the bargainers over time and, thus, codetermines the agreed
contract. The equilibrium payoffs depend on the envy parameter of each bargainer and their
discount factors. If bargainers have the same envy and discount factor, then the difference be-
tween their equilibrium payoffs is smaller than the difference in equilibrium payoffs predicted
by Rubinstein. More envious bargainers can ensure higher shares. If the bargainer who has the
first move is sufficiently more envious than the other bargainer, then he obtains a share that is
higher than in the Rubinstein solution, but this advantage can be offset by impatience expressed
though a lower discount factor in the model. Notably, the relative strengths of envy in compar-
ison to bargainers’ self-interest impact the alternating-offer bargaining outcome through two
channels: First, there is a direct effect of envy, imposed by its weight in the utility function, due
to which the disadvantaged bargainer directly suffers from an unequal division. Second, there
is an indirect effect of envy since the credible threat of realizing a fairer allocation in the future,
in case of disagreement, strengthens the bargaining position of the envious bargainer, who re-
ceives the smaller share, as well as the bargaining position of the envy-free bargainer asserting
the large share. As in the Rubinstein solution, the more patient the bargainers, the smaller the
difference between their payoffs. If bargainers are free of envy then bargaining proceeds as
predicted by Rubinstein.
Section 2 reviews evidence of envy and fairness in infinite horizon alternating-offer bargain-
ing and related theory. Section 3 introduces the bargaining problem with envious bargainers.
In section 4, I derive the optimal bargaining behavior and the selected contract. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 Related literature
Envy may refer to interpersonal comparisons of well-being in its colloquial use or to an in-
trapersonal comparison of different consumption bundles, for instance, in the fair division lit-
erature (see, Herreiner & Puppe 2009). Herreiner and Puppe distinguish interpersonal (the
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maximin principle or inequality aversion) and intrapersonal criteria (envy freeness) by experi-
ments on fair division problems. They find a limited role of intrapersonal comparisons in the
bargaining and evidence in support of “inequality aversion as an empirically relevant fairness
criterion”, concluding that interpersonal criteria seem to be “deeply ingrained in human behav-
ior”. Weg et al. (1990) and Zwick et al. (1992) assess the predictive accuracy of the Rubinstein
solution with respect to variations in the discount factor and uncertainty about the bargain-
ing horizon, respectively. Weg et al. limit the number of trials until agreement to 20 rounds,
resulting in a termination of 7 out of 324 bargaining games in their experiment. First period
demands were accepted in 48.6 to 75 percent of the games, but agreements differed from those
predicted by the Rubinstein and models that invoke “notions of equity or equality accounted
for a substantial percentage of the agreements”. Zwick et al.’s experiment was motivated by
the formal similarity between discounting and the probability of continuing the bargaining.
In the experiment, bargaining could be randomly terminated after each period. The discount
factor is interpreted as a probability of continuing the game after rejection of a proposal. Their
results reject both the subgame perfect equilibrium and equal division solutions. First period
agreement increased with the probability of termination and, in all cases, mean demands were
closer to the equal division than the Rubinstein division. Other experiments on infinite hori-
zon bargaining test the Rubinstein solution for the case in which bargainers have a fixed cost of
bargaining (e.g., Rapoport et al. 1990). Several studies were conducted changing Rubinstein’s
original framework. For instance, Binmore et al. (1991, 1989) impose outside options or an
optional or forced breakdown and document the sensitivity of subjects to the bargaining struc-
ture. A survey of infinite horizon bargaining theory including the aforementioned and further
classic experiments is provided by Weg & Zwick (1999).
Binmore et al. (2007) offer another experiment to test Rubinstein’s bargaining model with
bargainers who face unequal discount factors. The computer interrupted games in which pro-
posals keep being refused after 3 to 7 rejections. Considering that the Rubinstein model is
highly stylized, they test a perturbed version that takes into account “some of the peculiarities
of human psychology.” The perturbed model predicts the sign of deviations in the opening
proposal from the final undiscounted agreement in the previous period. Learning, rationality
and fairness are all significant in determining the outcome. Binmore et al. (2007) confirm that
subjects tend to exploit the first mover advantage and that the final outcomes are shifted away
from the Rubinstein prediction towards a more equal division. They conclude that “the un-
derlying structure of Rubinstein’s solution to the bargaining problem holds up unexpectedly
well [while] the precise form of the Rubinstein solution is fragile [and that] future research [...]
needs to focus on the nature of the psychological quirks that perturb Rubinstein’s basically
sound model in real bargaining situations.”
Focusing on finite horizon alternating-offer bargaining, Bolton (1991) incorporated money
and fairness (relative money) into bargainer utility functions.1 His comparative model is con-
sistent with five enumerated bargaining regularities, including partitions that deviate from the
narrow self-interest equilibrium in the direction of the equal division. In the Rubinstein bar-
gaining problem, the influence of regard for others is investigated, for instance, by Driesen et al.
(2012) under the assumption of loss averse bargainers. The reference point associated with loss
1Ståhl (1972) proposed a model similar to Rubinstein’s framework for finite horizon bargaining problems. The
majority of experiments tests the former theory.
3
aversion equals the highest proposed share turned down by the opponent in the past. Agree-
ment is immediate and, in equilibrium, the bargainers’ strategies depend only on the current
reference points. Higher loss aversions leads to a lower share of the surplus in equilibrium.
Loss aversion with a fixed reference point at the equal division becomes an alternative inter-
pretation of envy and vice versa.2 Also Miettinen (2010) studies open-ended alternating-offer
bargaining with bargainers who have history dependent reciprocity preferences. Preferences
in the highly stylized model only depend on the history of rejected proposals, rather than also
on the bargainers’ beliefs. The framework is related to Li (2007), Fershtman & Seidmann (1993)
or Compte & Jehiel (2004), which assume that the bargaining history itself influences the bar-
gainers’ preferences. With reciprocal aspirations, the proposing bargainer faces a trade-off be-
tween the share he receives if the proposed partition is accepted and the worsened bargaining
position due to the increase in the opponent’s aspiration if the proposed share is rejected. Mi-
ettinen’s model illustrates that endogenous aspirations on their own do not imply delay, but
the bargainer who starts the bargaining can become disadvantaged when both bargainers are
sufficiently patient due to the reciprocal motivations’ inverse relation to previous proposals.
Relaxing the assumption of complete information, Kohler (2012b) studies uncertainty about
the strength of the second bargainer’s envy in a finite alternating-offer bargaining problem.
Similar to the influence of envy in infinite horizon bargaining, the agreed contract can contain
an equal division with or without delay, which results from the need to incur costs in order
to credibly signal a psychological element in the preferences. In open-ended alternating-offer
bargaining with complete information, envy, qualitatively, has the opposite effects of low guilt
that are studied in a model of similar first and second mover preferences by Kohler (2012a).
Montero (2008) studies bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a
model with irrevocable choice of partner, neither altruism nor spite is unambiguously benefi-
cial. In a theoretical analysis of bargaining games, in which unanimity is not required, Montero
(2007) shows two effects of inequality aversion: The payoff division inside a coalition can be
more unequal once responders prefer to accept a lower share rather to the risk of being left
out. As bargainers become more impatient, the advantage of the proposer can be reduced; i.e.,
inequality aversion may also revers the effect of impatience.
3 Bargaining model
Two bargainers i, j ∈ {b, s}, called seller and buyer, have to reach an agreement on the partition
of a surplus of size one which depreciates after any disagreement. Bargaining takes place at
periods of time t = 1, 2, ..., T. Depreciation is modeled by assigning discount factors δs and δb
to the two bargainers. By naming a partition pt ∈ (0, 1] in odd periods, the seller demands
share pt and offers share (1− pt) that the buyer can accept or reject. In even periods, the buyer
proposes a partition pt to the seller that he can accept or reject. If a partition is accepted the
game ends in period T. This bargaining outcome is denoted (pT, T).
Assuming complete information in this bargaining problem, Rubinstein (1982) has shown
2The model of loss aversion represents bargaining with envy as the special case with reference point ri = 0.5
and loss aversion coefficient λi = 2αi under the additional assumption of a common discount factor δ. The bar-
gaining model with envy evolved separately adding an alternative interpretation to the corresponding equilibrium
outcome.
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the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) under generic preference as-
sumptions.3 For preferences ui (xi) = xi, where utility is derived from own payoff xi, Rubin-
stein derived an explicit solution, in which the seller proposes and the buyer accepts partition
p∗ = 1−δs1−δsδb ∈ (0, 1] in period 1. The equilibrium outcome is supported by the bargainers’ simi-
lar strategies: Bargainer i always demands the equilibrium share p∗, when it his turn to make a
proposal, otherwise accepts any share equal or greater than δi p∗ and refuses any smaller share.
The demand of p∗ is the highest share that is accepted by the other bargainer j. Bargainer i can-
not gain by asking a lower share, for it too will be accepted. Stipulating a higher (and rejected)
share and waiting to accept bargainer j’s counteroffer in the next period hurts bargainer i as
δi (1− p∗) = δiδj p∗ < p∗.
This paper harnesses the generality of Rubinstein’s framework and investigates the strate-
gic behavior of bargainers who care, to some extend, about relative as well as absolute payoff
in the described bargaining process. Relative payoff hereby means bargainers compare their
own benefit xi from accepting a certain partition to the benefit of the other bargainer xj, and
put weight αi ≥ 0 on the difference whenever the own benefit is lower. This relative concern is
interpreted as envy. Explicitly, I assume that the utility function of the bargainers is given by:
ui
(
xi, xj
)
= xi − αi max
{
xj − xi, 0
}
These preferences are an asymmetric version of inequality aversion as originally put forward
in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and extended by altruism in Kohler (2011). Inequality aversion
consistently predicts a rich set of stylized experimental behavior (e.g., Cooper & Kagel n.d.;
Fehr & Schmidt 1999). Throughout, us(pt) := us(pt, 1 − pt) denotes the seller’s utility and
ub(pt) := ub(1− pt, pt) the corresponding buyer’s utility if a proposed partition pt is accepted
in period t.
4 Subgame perfect equilibrium
Proposition 1. The alternating-offer bargaining problem with envious and discounting bargainers has
a unique SPE. If δs ≤ 1+2αb2+2αb−δb and δb ≤
1+2αs
2+2αs−δs , then the seller immediately receives:
p∗ =
(1+ 2αs) (1+ αb)− δb (1+ αs)
(1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αb)− δsδb
The proof of proposition 1 is based on Shaked & Sutton (1984) who applied backwards
induction in a truncation of the infinite horizon game: The beginning of the infinite horizon
game is equal to its subgame in the third round, should it be reached. In odd periods, the seller
3(i) Trade is desirable: ∂u(x)∂x > 0. This assumption allows for altruistic but can exclude envious bargainers.
As shown in the paper, Rubinstein’s result of a unique SPE that includes immediate acceptance of the initial pro-
posal holds for envious bargainers as well (see also Montero 2008), (ii) Time is valuable: δ < 1, (iii) Continuity:
limx→x u (x) = limx←x u (x), (iv) Stationarity: preferences are time independent, (v) The larger the share the more
compensation a bargainer needs for a delay of one period to be immaterial to him. Strategies are said to constitute a
SPE if, in every subgame, the strategies relating to that subgame form a Nash equilibrium. In a SPE, a bargainer will
agree to a proposal if it offers at least as much as he will obtain in the future given the strategies of both bargainers.
Rubinstein (1982) states the precise definition.
5
is proposing and then bargainers alternate in making subsequent offers until an agreement is
reached.
Proof. Suppose the above strategies induce a backwards induction outcome (p∗, 1) of the game
as a whole. It is possible to use the partition p∗ in the subgame starting in the third period
assuming it was reached and, then, to work back to the first period. In the backward induction
outcome of the whole game the seller will propose p1 = pi (p3) in period 1 and the buyer will
accept. If pi (.) is a monotone function then the equilibrium partition is uniquely defined by
p∗ = pi (p∗). In order to determine pi (.), the periods in which envy influences the bargainers’
decisions need to be identified. For now, assume the payoff distribution uniquely favors the
proposing bargainer who demands at least half of the surplus, i.e., p1 ≥ 0.5, p2 ≤ 0.5, p3 ≥
0.5. The existence of is advantage of the proposing bargainer is established after deriving the
equilibrium outcome.
The period 3 subgame begins with a successful proposal of partition p3 ∈ [0, 0.5] by an
envy-free seller. Consequently, the lowest share p2 =
αs(1+2αb)+δs(1+αb)−δsδb
(1+2αs)(1+2αb)−δsδb that is accepted by
the seller in period 2 gives him the equivalent of his outside option, the discounted period 3
utility. Similarly, the highest share p1 =
1+αb
1+2αb
− δb 1+αs−δs p3(1+2αs)(1+2αb) that is accepted by the envy-
perceiving buyer in period 1 gives him the equivalent of his outside option, the discounted
period 2 utility. Indifferent bargainers are assumed to accept the proposed share. As ub(p2) ≥
δub(p3) and us(p1) ≥ δus(p2), the buyer and seller prefer proposing the just agreeable shares
p2 and p1 to disagreement with the subsequent counteroffer.
Since the game in period 3 is identical to the game in period 1, the unique fixed point
p∗ := p1 (p3) ≡ p3 defines the equilibrium partition:
p∗ =
(1+ 2αs) (1+ αb)− δb (1+ αs)
(1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αb)− δsδb
As only p2 and p1 maximize the utility of the bargainer proposing the partition, there is no
other SPE.
The advantage of the proposing bargainer on the equilibrium path requires p2 ≤ 0.5, which
implies δs ≤ 1+2αb2+2αb−δb , and p∗ ≥ 0.5, which implies δb ≤
1+2αs
2+2αs−δs . This completes the derivation
of the Rubinstein result for a model with envy concerned bargainers.
The conditions δs ≤ 1+2αb2+2αb−δb and δb ≤
1+2αs
2+2αs−δs also ensure a unique sign of the partial
derivatives of the equilibrium partition ∂p
∗
∂αs
, ∂p
∗
∂δs
≥ 0 and ∂p∗∂αb ,
∂p∗
∂δb
≤ 0 with respect to the seller’s
and buyer’s envy and discount factor, respectively. If bargainers value time similarly but differ
in their strengths of envy, then the partial derivatives of p∗ (αs, αb, δ) with respect to envy have
these unique signs unconditionally and the partial derivatives with respect to the common
discount factor is negative. The partial derivatives of the equilibrium partition p∗ (α, δ) =
1+α
1+2α+δ with respect to common envy or a common discount factor
∂p∗
∂α ,
∂p∗
∂δ ≤ 0 are negative.
These results are derived in the appendix.
Note that the assumption p∗ ≥ 0.5 and p2 ≤ 0.5 under which the equilibrium is derived
is always true for a common discount factor as ∂p
∗
∂αs
≥ 0, ∂p∗∂αb ,
∂p∗
∂δ ≤ 0 and, hence, the infimum
limαb→∞ p
∗ (0, αb, 0) of p∗ (αs, αb, δ) is 0.5. Similarly, p2 ≤ 0.5 as ∂p2∂αb ≤ 0,
∂p2
∂αs
, ∂p2∂δ ≥ 0 and, hence,
the supremum limαs→∞ p2 (αs, 0, 1) of p2 (αs, αb, δ) equals 0.5.
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5 Conclusion
Bargainers may incur a loss of utility if they receive the smaller share of a surplus to be divided
in a bargaining process. Loss aversion with respect to disadvantageous deviations from the
equal division can be interpreted as envy. Envy reinforces the bargaining position of each
bargainer in open-ended alternating-offer bargaining with two parties: The non-credible threat
of a non-envious bargainer to reject unequal contracts becomes credible in the case with envy. If
the two bargainers are similarly envious, then the partition agreed between envious bargainers
departs from the Rubinstein solution converging towards an equal division. Therefore, being
symmetrically envious is not equivalent to being without envy in this strategic context.
The signs of the partial derivatives of the equilibrium partition imply: First, the more en-
vious the bargainers who share similar preferences, the more fair the immediately agreed out-
come of the bargaining in comparison to the Rubinstein division. Second, ceteris paribus, each
bargainer’s share increases in his own envy and patience. Taken separately the bargainers’
distributional concerns have opposite effects. If the bargainer, who starts the bargaining, is
substantially more envious than the second bargainer, he can realize a share greater than pre-
dicted in the Rubinstein outcome because the threat to reject uneven counteroffers primarily
increases his bargaining position. Third, also in the extended equilibrium outcome the agree-
ment is immediate. If bargainers are equally patient, like in the Rubinstein solution, the higher
a common discount factor the more equal will be the offer. As both bargainers’ discount factors
approach unity, bargainers divide the surplus equally. Taking the limits of the equilibrium par-
tition of equally discounting bargainers shows that the equilibrium partition is strictly greater
than half and that, for common envy and discounting, the equilibrium partition lies between
an equal division and the Rubinstein division.4
Envious bargainers agree on the equal division if they are both perfectly patient but also if
the first bargainer’s marginal utility from reducing a disadvantageous situation by one incre-
ment scaled by his impatience equals the second bargainer’s utility of receiving this additional
increment in the next period scaled by his impatience. In other words, if the rate of the first
bargainer’s marginal utility from reducing an disadvantageous situation by one increment and
the second bargainer’s utility of receiving this additional increment in the next period equals
his relative impatience. Equally patient and envious bargainers split equally if the first bar-
gainer’s marginal utility from reducing a disadvantageous situation by one increment equals
the second bargainer’s utility of receiving this additional increment in the next period.5 As
in a heterogeneous population of envious and non-envious bargainers the envious types real-
ize higher shares in the bargaining than their non-envious counterparts, each bargaining party
prefers to bargain with a non-envious type.
4The limits of the equilibrium partition are derived in appendix.
5Equal division in equilibrium p∗ (αs, αb, δs, δb) = 0.5 implies 1+2αs1−δs =
δb
1−δb or
1+2αs
δb
= 1−δs1−δb . For equal bargainers
p∗ (α, δ) = 0.5 implies 1+ 2αs = δb.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Partial derivatives and limits
6.1.1 Individual envy and discounting
The equilibrium partition p∗ (αs, αb, δs, δb) is given by
p∗ =
(1+ 2αs) (1+ αb)− δb (1+ αs)
(1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αb)− δsδb =:
N
D
The partial derivatives of the equilibrium partition are given by
∂p∗
∂δs
=
δb
D2
[αs (1+ αb) + (1+ αb − δb) (1+ αs)] ≥ 0
∂p∗
∂δb
= −1+ 2αs
D2
[(1+ αs) αb + (1+ αs − δs) (1+ αb)] ≤ 0
∂p∗
∂αs
=
δb
D2
[(1− δs) (1+ 2αb)− δs (1− δb)] ≥ 0 if δs ≤ 1+ 2αb2+ 2αb − δb
∂p∗
∂αb
= −1+ 2αs
D2
[(1− δb) (1+ 2αs)− δb (1− δs)] ≤ 0 if δb ≤ 1+ 2αs2αs − δs + 2
The respective signs follow from evaluating the derivatives. The limits of the equilib-
rium offer p∗ (αs, αb, δb, δs) are given by limαs→∞ p∗ =
(1+2αb)+(1−δb)
2(1+2αb)
∈ [0.5, 1], limδs→1 p∗ =
(1+2αs)(1+αb)−δb(1+αs)
(1+2αs)(1+2αb)−δb ∈ [0.5, 1], limαb→∞ p∗ = 0.5, limδb→1 p∗ =
(1+2αs)(1+αb)−(1+αs)
(1+2αs)(1+2αb)−δs ∈ [0, 0.5];
limαs,αb→0 p
∗ = 1−δs1−δsδb ∈ [0, 1], limαs,αb→∞ p∗ = 0.5 and limδs,δb→0 p∗ =
1+αb
1+2αb
∈ [0.5, 1], limδs,δb→1 p∗ =
0.5. The limiting values follow from evaluating the limits or limαs→a limαb→a p
∗, limαb→a limαs→a p
∗
fora ∈ {0,∞} and limδs→d limδb→d p∗, limδb→d limδs→d p∗ for d ∈ {0, 1}, respectively.
6.1.2 Individual envy and common discounting
The equilibrium partition p∗ (αs, αb, δ) is given by
p∗ =
(1+ 2αs) (1+ αb)− (1+ αs) δ
(1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αb)− δ2 =:
N
D
The partial derivatives of the equilibrium partition are given by
∂p∗
∂δ
= − 1
D2
[
(1+ αs) (1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αb) + δ2 (1+ αs)− 2δ (1+ 2αs) (1+ αb)
] ≤ 0
∂p∗
∂αs
=
1
D2
δ (1− δ) (1+ 2αb − δ) ≥ 0
∂p∗
∂αb
= − 1
D2
(1− δ) (1+ 2αs) (1+ 2αs − δ) ≤ 0
The optimal partition p2 (αs, αb, δ) to be offered in bargaining period 2 of the truncated game
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is p2 =
δp∗+αs
1+2αs
. Its partial derivatives and their respective signs are
∂p2
∂δ
=
p∗
1+ 2αs
≥ 0
∂p2
∂αb
=
δ
1+ 2αs
∂p∗
∂αb
≤ 0
∂p2
∂αs
=
δ
∂p∗
∂αs
(1+ 2αs) + 1− 2δp∗
(1+ 2αs)
2 ≥ 0
The respective signs follow from evaluating the derivatives. The limits of the equilibrium
offer p∗ (αs, αb, δ) are given by limδ→0 p∗ = 1+αb1+2αb ∈ [0.5, 1), limδ→1 p∗ =
αs+αb+2αsαb
2αs+2αb+4αsαb
= 0.5;
limαs→0 p∗ =
1+αb−δ
1+2αb−δ2 ∈ [0.5, 1), limαs→∞ p
∗ = 1+αb−0.5δ1+2αb ∈ [0.5, 1); limαb→0 p∗ =
(1+αs)(1−δ)+αs
1+2αs−δ2 ∈
(0.5, 1), limαb→∞ p
∗ = 1+2αs2(1+2αs) = 0.5 and limαs,αb→0 p
∗ = (1+ δ)−1, limαs,αb→∞ p
∗ = 0.5. The
limiting values follow from evaluating the limits.
6.1.3 Common envy and discounting
The equilibrium partition p∗ (α, δ) is given by
1+ α
1+ 2α+ δ
=:
N
D
The partial derivatives of the equilibrium partition are given by
∂p∗
∂α
= − 1
D2
(1− δ) ≤ 0
∂p∗
∂δ
= − 1
D2
(1+ α) ≤ 0
The respective signs follow from evaluating the derivatives. The limits of the equilibrium
offer p∗ (α, δ) are given by limδ→0 p∗ = 1+α1+2α+ε ∈ [0.5, 1), limδ→1 p∗ = 0.5 and limα→0 p∗ =
1
1+δ ∈ [0.5, 1], limα→∞ p∗ = 0.5. The limiting values follow from evaluating the limits.
6.2 Model calibration
Bargaining experiments that try to implement infinite horizon style bargaining are forced to
terminate after a finite number of bargaining periods, typically reached only exceptionally. As
players are aware of this condition, an alternative approach introduced by Zwick et al. (1992)
implements the common discount factor as a fixed probability of exogenous breakdown rather
than as cost of delay. Mean demands in Zwick et al.’s experiment were closer to the equal
split than to the Rubinstein division. In games with continuation probability of 910 ,
2
3 and
1
6 ,
the Rubinstein division allocates 52.6, 60.00 and 85.71 percent of the surplus to be divided to
the proposer, respectively. Previous studies conducted by Binmore et al. (1989) and Weg et al.
(1990) examined bargaining with comparable discount factors. I use the results of all three
studies (as summarized by Zwick et al.) to impute the average strength of envy α in the model
of common envy and discounting. According to the SPE solution, first period demands of the
Rubinstein division should be accepted. As delay occurs but is not studied, I report envy values
from model calibrations based on the partitions observed in the first and final periods of the
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Table 1: Mean first period and accepted final period partition, imputed envy
Treatment
δ = 910 δ =
2
3 δ =
1
6
BSS ZRH WRS ZRH WRS ZRH
First period partition (%) 55.3 54.2 52.02 53.30 57.33 54.84
(0) (0) (3.292) (1.692) (2.258) (3.721)
Final period partition (%) 50.2 50.1 51.22 50.82 54.77 53.61
(11.6) (24.1) (5.997) (9.329) (3.784) (5.187)
Notes: Binmore et al. (1989) (BSS), Weg et al. (1990) (WRS), Zwick et al. (1992) (ZRH). δ denotes the discount factor
(BSS, WRS) or a probability of continuation (ZRH). Imputed strength of envy α in parentheses. No envy is the
border solution when non-admitted negative envy values are imputed. Rubinstein division (%): 52.6, 60.00, 85.71.
Figure 1: Observed and predicted partition at different discount factors
Notes: Circles indicate first period partitions. Boxes indicate final period partitions. Discount factor δ from top to
bottom 16 ,
2
3 and
9
10 .
experiments (table 1).
The strength of envy varies approximately from 2 to 5 in the low patience treatment, from
2 to 9 in the medium patience treatment and from 0 to 24 in the high patience treatment. In the
high patience treatment, the model assumes the border solution of no envy and predicts a more
equal division than observed in the first period. As the discount factor increases, the Rubinstein
division (without envy) converges to the equal split and, therefore, the additional impact of the
other-regarding motive decreases (figure 1). Thus, small differences in the observed partition
have a high impact on the imputed envy in the high discount factor treatment.
Strengths of envy imputed in the low discount factor treatment are in line with earlier cal-
ibrations of the full inequality aversion model including envy and guilt. Stylized ultimatum
game behavior, for instance, is reproduced by Fehr & Schmidt (1999) assuming strengths of
envy from 0.5 to 4 for 70 percent of the players. This comparison is flawed, however, if an
ambivalent impact of guilt (see Kohler 2012a) is unduly neglected in the alternating-offer bar-
gaining model. The equilibrium partition candidate in a model of common envy, guilt and
discount factor, under the assumption that the equilibrium payoff distribution uniquely favors
the proposing bargainer, is (1+α)(1+2α−δ)+δβ(1−2β+δ)
(1+2α)2−δ2(1−2β)(1+2β) , but alternating-offer bargaining amongst
inequality averse bargainers that perceive envy and guilt is outside the scope of this paper.
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